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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2003).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
L

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Machock's Complaint states a

valid cause of action against Fink for breach of contract for payment on an absolute
Guarantee?
The trial court's denial of Fink's motion for summary judgment on this issue is
reviewed for correctness. Malibu Investment Company v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, f 12, 996
P.2d 1043, 1047 (trial court's decision granting or denying summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. at 496-506.
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Machock complied with the

purpose of section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code and the restrictions of section 57-1-32 apply
to Machock's suit against Fink for payment on the Guarantee?
The trial court's denial of Fink's motion for summary judgment on this issue is
reviewed for correctness. State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, f 8, 44 P.3d 680, 684 (trial
court's conclusions of law and interpretation of a statutory provision are questions of law
reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved in the trial court. R. at 496-506.
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2003). Sale of trust property
by trustee. Action to recover balance due upon obligation
for which trust deed was given as security. Collection of
costs and attorney's fees.1
At any time within three months after any sale of property
under a trust deed as provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24
and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security, and in that action the complaint shall set
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured
by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold,
and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair
market value of the property at the date of sale. The court
may not render judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of
the sale. In any action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This dispute involves the attempt by defendant and appellant Carl William Fink
("Fink") to avoid payment to plaintiff and appellee Joseph Machock ("Machock")
pursuant to a written Guarantee agreement for a Note Secured by Deed of Trust ("Note")
executed by third-party defendant John Harmer ("Harmer"). The Guarantee agreement is
one of absolute payment, making Fink's liability to Machock fixed upon Harmer's
default. R. at 273-77.

1

Although amended in 2001, no substantive changes were made to this section.
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On May 29, 1998, Harmer executed the Note in the principal amount of $150,000,
payable on demand to Machock. R. at 269. The Note was secured with a second priority
Trust Deed against Harmer's residence. R. at 271. A first priority May 1, 1997 trust
deed was held by Brighton Bank in the principal amount of $293,742. R. at 454-58. As a
condition to extending the loan evidenced by the Note, Machock required Harmer to
obtain a guaranty from Fink. R. at 273. On May 29, 1998, Fink executed the Guarantee
agreement whereby Fink unconditionally guaranteed the full and timely performance by
Harmer of all of his obligations under the Note. R. at 273-77.
On September 22, 1999, Harmer informed Machock that he was not able to pay
the remaining balance owed on the Note. R. at 465-66. On October 4, 1999, David
Detton, prior counsel for Machock, informed Gregory Barrick of Durham, Jones &
Pinegar, counsel for Fink, that he would be filing a Complaint against Fink for payment
under the Guarantee agreement, and that a nonjudicial foreclosure of the Harmer' Trust
Deed would also be commenced. R. at 465-66.
Machock's Complaint was filed on October 15, 1999. R. at 1-3. It alleges a cause
of action for breach of contract for payment on the Guarantee agreement. The trustee's
sale of the Harmer' Trust Deed was held on February 29, 2000. R. at 283. Machock was
the successful bidder at the sale with a credit bid of $1,000 subject to the pending
nonjudicial foreclosure of Brighton Bank's trust deed.

R. at 463-64.

The bank's

successor subsequently foreclosed on the property and was also the successful bidder. R.
at 531, Tr. at p. 24.
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This appeal involves Fink's efforts to reverse that part of the trial court's March
19, 2003 Ruling denying Fink's motion for summary judgment. Fink argues that with the
trustee's sale of Harmer's Trust Deed on February 29, 2000, Machock's Complaint
should be dismissed because Machock failed to file a second Complaint, or amend his
original Complaint, within the three-month limitation period of section 57-1-32 of the
Utah Code to allege the restrictions stated in section 57-1-32.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

1.

On October 15, 1999, Machock filed a breach of contract action against

Fink in the Second Judicial District Court to collect payment on a Guarantee agreement.
R. at 1-3. Paragraph 7 of Machock's Complaint specifically alleges that "[b]ut for the
execution and delivery of the Guarantee, Plaintiff would not have extended the loan to
Harmer evidenced by the Note and the loan was made in reliance upon Defendant's
Guarantee." R. at 2.
2.

On October 21, 1999, Machock commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure of

Harmer's second priority Trust Deed by recording a Notice of Default. R. at 286.
3.

On January 10, 2000, Fink filed an Answer and Counterclaim ("Answer").

R. at 4-19. In his Answer, Fink asserts that he "demanded that Machock seek foreclosure
of the collateral pledged by Harmer to secure the loan." R. at 7.

Fink's Seventh

Affirmative Defense likewise asserts that "Machock's purported claim for relief in his
Complaint is barred by the one action rule." R. at 8. Fink's Eighth Affirmative Defense
asserts that "Machock's purported claim for relief is barred by his failure to exhaust the
collateral that secures the Note and by the provisions of the Once Action Rule, Utah Code
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Ann. § 78-37-1 (1996)." R. at 8. In his Counterclaim, Fink asserts that he is entitled to a
declaratory judgment that Machock must first seek to foreclose upon and otherwise
exhaust the real property collateral pledged by Harmer to secure his obligations under the
Note before he can seek to recover from Fink any unsatisfied obligation under the Note,
if he is entitled to any such recovery at all. R. at 15, 19.
4.

On February 29, 2000, Machock held a trustee's sale on Harmer's second

priority Trust Deed. R. at 283. Machock submitted the only bid at the foreclosure sale,
which was a credit bid of $1,000 subject to the outstanding obligation owed under the
pending foreclosure of the first priority trust deed of Brighton Bank in the amount of
approximately $300,000. R. at 463-64. Machock therefore took title to the real property
subject to the pending foreclosure of the first priority trust deed. R. at 283; 286-87.
5.

On July 31, 2000, Machock and Harmer entered into a Settlement

Agreement and Mutual Release ("Settlement Agreement"). R. at 289-92. Pursuant to
this Settlement Agreement, Harmer executed a Confession of Judgment for the entry of
judgment against him in the amount of $152,757. R. at 293-95.
6.

On October 11, 2000, Fink filed an Amended Answer, Amended

Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint ("Amended Answer"). R. at 84-106. Fink's
First Defense in the Amended Answer states that "[t]he Complaint fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted against Fink." R. at 85. Fink also asserts in his Eleventh
Affirmative Defense that Machock failed to mitigate his damages. R. at 89. Fink's
Twelfth Affirmative Defense asserts that "Fink's obligation under the Guarantee, if any
such obligation there is or was, should be reduced by the fair market value of the real
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property upon which Machock foreclosed"

R. at 89. (emphasis added).

In his

Amended Counterclaim, Fink asserts that "Machock's only recourse to recover Harmer's
obligation under the Note is for him to foreclose on the real property pledged by Harmer
to secure his obligations under the Note." R. at 97. Fink further asserts that he is entitled
to a declaratory judgment that Machock's only recourse "is the foreclosure on the real
property pledged by Harmer which Machock has pursued, and to pursue repayment
from Harmer." R. at 98 (emphasis added).
7.

On October 31, 2000, Machock filed a Reply to Fink's Amended

Counterclaim. R. at 247-60. In paragraph 26 of the Amended Counterclaim, Fink alleges
that Machock claims his right to recovery regardless of whether he has foreclosed upon
the Harmer property. In his Reply to Fink's allegations, Machock states that "this issue
has been mooted by the completion of foreclosure proceedings against the Harmer
residence, which failed to yield any funds to satisfy Machock's lien when Machock was
unable to sell the Harmer residence before the foreclosure of the prior first trust deed."
R. at 255. Machock further asserts in his Eighth Affirmative Defense to Fink's Amended
Counterclaim that:
Defendant's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by his
failure to mitigate damages, including without limitation
Defendant's failure to accept the tender of the Trust Deed,
Defendant's failure to accept the tender of the opportunity to
direct the marketing and sale of the Harmer residence,
Defendant's failure to accept the tender of the opportunity to
maintain and repair the Harmer residence pending its sale to
preserve the fair market value of the property, Defendant's
failure to respond with reasonable promptness to potential
offers to purchase the Harmer residence, and Defendant's
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failure to accept the tender of the Judgment by Confession
entered against Harmer.
R. at 258.
8.

On December 29, 2000, Machock served Fink with Machock's Second Set

of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. R. at 152-56. On January
29, 2001, Fink served his responses to Machock's Second Set of Interrogatories and
Requests For Production of Documents. R. at 192-93. Fink's responses were not filed
with the trial court, but Interrogatory No. 15, with Fink's response, provides as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify any expert
retained in this matter, the subject of any such expert's
opinion, and the basis for that opinion.
RESPONSE: Fink has retained Marty Bodell to give an
opinion as to the fair market value of the Harmer residence as
of February 2000. Fink will produce a copy of Mr. Bodell's
written appraisal which states the substance of Mr. Bodell's
opinion and the basis for that opinion.
See Addendum, Exhibit "A."
9.

On February 1, 2001, Fink filed a motion for summary judgment against

Machock on two issues. R. at 195-97. The first issue, pursuant to Fink's First Defense in
his Amended Answer, was that Machock's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The second issue, pursuant to the Thirteenth Affirmative Defense
in the Amended Answer, was that Machock expressly released Harmer from his
obligation under the Note and that the release also relieved Fink from his obligations
pursuant to the Guarantee agreement. R. at 195-97.2

Fink has not appealed the trial court's Ruling on the second issue.
560016 1

7

10.

On March 19, 2003, the trial court granted in part, and denied in part Fink's

motion for summary judgment. R. at 496-505. In the Ruling on Fink's first issue that
Machock's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the trial
court held that Machock's Complaint stated a valid cause of action against Fink. R. at
500. The trial court also held that Machock complied with the purpose of section 57-1-32
and the restrictions of section 57-1-32 would be applied to Machock's claim. R. at 505.
Specifically, the trial court ruled:
This court could provide Machock with an opportunity to
amend his Complaint to conform to the parameters of § 57-132, however, a more efficient approach would simply apply
the restrictions of the statute to the current complaint. Under
the "more sensible view" of Kirkbride, the Act is satisfied
when "notice" is given to the debtor. Machock filed a
complaint against Fink prior to the foreclosure, informed Fink
of the foreclosure sale, and has been in fairly regular contact
with Fink regarding the suit, the damages, and any potential
deficiencies. This Court rules that the three month notice and
filing requirement has been well satisfied by Machock, and
although Machock's action is now governed by the terms of
§ 57-1-32, he may now proceed having fulfilled the three
month filing requirement.
R. at 502-03.
11.

On April 9, 2003, Fink filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Permission to

Appeal requesting an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's Ruling. R. at 515-16.
12.

On May 5, 2003, Machock served Fink with responses to Fink's April 2,

2003 discovery requests.

R. at 525-26.

Relevant interrogatories, with Machock's

responses, were not filed with the trial court, but provide as follows:
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INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the full amount that you
will seek to recover from Fink at trial based on the Note and
guarantee.
RESPONSE: Machock will seek to recover the entire amount
of principal and interest due and owing under the Guarantee,
in addition to all costs and attorneys' fees incurred to date,
which include Machock's Opposition to Fink's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Machock's Answer to Fink's
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. As of May 15, 2003, the
outstanding debt owed by Fink, exclusive of attorneys' fees
and costs, totals $157,033.42, which includes interest at the
rate of 10% per annum from September 22, 2001 to date. As
interest is accruing on this unpaid balance and attorneys' fees
and costs continue to be incurred, which are excluded from
the above balance, the amount that Machock will seek to
recover at trial will continue to increase.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State in detailed [sic] how you
calculate the amount identified in response to interrogatory
no. 1, and identify all documents that pertain to this
calculation.
RESPONSE: The amount identified in interrogatory no. 1
was calculated by determining the unpaid principal and
interest owed to date pursuant to Fink's Guarantee. Interest
on this amount was determined pursuant to section 15-1-1(2)
of the Utah Code. All costs and attorneys' fees will be based
on an Affidavit of Fees and Costs from counsel to be filed at
trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State what you will claim at
trial as the fair market value for the property at 1963 E.
Ridgehill Drive, Bountiful, Utah, as of February 29, 2000 (the
date of the trustee's sale based on the deed of trust given in
favor of Joseph Machock).
RESPONSE:
As of February 20 [sic], 2000, Machock
believes that the fair market value of the property at 1963
Ridgehill Drive to be $308,613.38.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: State in detailed [sic] how you
calculate the fair market value identified in response to

9

interrogatory no. 3, and identify all documents that pertain to
this calculation.
RESPONSE: As of February 29, 2000, Machock had
received notice of Brighton Bank's Notice of Default and
Election to Sell, dated February 2, 2000. Upon receiving this
notice, Machock informed Fink that he did not have the
ability to pay the amount due and owing under Brighton
Bank's trust deed and that Fink should therefore protect his
interests as Machock intended to pursue Fink's liability
pursuant to his guarantee of payment. Accordingly, the fair
market value of the property at 1963 Ridgehill Drive was
determined by calculating the amount Machock bid at the
June [sic] 29, 2000 foreclosure sale to obtain title to the
property. See also Response to Interrogatory no. 5, below.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify the amount you paid to
acquire title to the property at 1963 E. Ridgehill Drive via the
trustee's sale on February 29, 2000.
RESPONSE: Machock submitted a credit bid of $ 1,000 over
the amount due and owing pursuant to the first priority deed
of trust held by Brighton Bank. At this time, upon
information and belief, Machock believes the amount due and
owing pursuant to the Brighton Bank deed of trust to be
approximately $307,613.38, which represents the principal
and interest due under the deed of trust, together with costs of
foreclosure and attorneys' fees...
See Addendum, Exhibit "B."
13.

On June 10, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court granted Fink permission to

appeal from the trial court's Ruling. R. at 527.
C.

Disposition at the Trial Court

On March 19, 2003, the trial court issued its Ruling on Fink's motion for
summary judgment in which it granted Fink's motion for summary judgment in part, and
denied Fink's motion for summary judgment in part. R. at 496-505. The trial court ruled
that Machock's Complaint stated a valid breach of contract claim against Fink, Machock
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complied with the purpose of section 57-1-32 and the restrictions of section 57-1-32
would be applied to Machock's Complaint. In applying these restrictions, the trial court
ruled that Machock complied with the three-month limitation for filing a deficiency
action under that section and accordingly denied Fink's motion.
D.

Statement of Facts.

The undisputed facts material to the trial court's grant in part, and denial, in part,
of Fink's motion for summary judgment are as follows:
1.

On May 29, 1998, Harmer executed a Note whereby Machock agreed to

loan Harmer $150,000, secured by a Trust Deed in the sum of $150,000. R. at 269, 271.
2.

As a condition of securing the loan to Harmer, Machock required Fink to

execute an absolute Guarantee agreement, guaranteeing full and timely payment and
performance of Harmer's obligations under the Note. R. at 273-77. Relevant provisions
of the Guarantee include the following:
RECITALS
B.
As a condition to extending the Loan, Lender has
required Borrower to obtain a personal guarantee from
Guarantor of the full and timely payment and performance of
all of Borrower's obligations under the Note.
C.
Guarantor is willing to enter into this Guarantee in
order to facilitate Borrower's obtaining the Loan and to
guarantee Borrower's full and timely payment and
performance of all of his obligations under the Note.
AGREEMENT
1.1
Guaranty.
Guarantor hereby unconditionally
guarantees the full and timely performance by Borrower of all
of his obligations under the Note (the "Guaranteed
Obligations"). This guarantee is a guarantee of payment and
560016 1
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performance and not of collection, and is primary, not
secondary, in nature.
2.1
Lender's Rights. Guarantor hereby agrees that Lender
may, at his option, without notice to or further consent from
Guarantor, take any of the following actions without
impairing in any way the obligations of Guarantor hereunder
(it being the intent of the Guarantor and Lender that the
obligations of Guarantor hereunder shall be absolute and
unconditional and shall not be discharged except by payment
or performance or in accordance with this Guarantee): . . .
2.1.4 Retain or obtain the primary or secondary
liability of any party in addition to the Guarantor with respect
to the performance by Borrower of all or any part of the
Guaranteed Obligations;
2.1.5 Release his security interest in any property,
including without limitation all or part of the property
covered by the Trust Deed, securing the performance by
Borrower of all or any part of the Guaranteed Obligations;...
Waiver by Guarantor. Guarantor hereby expressly waives: ...
3.1.4 Any right to require Lender to proceed against
Borrower, the property covered by the Trust Deed, or any
other property or security held in relation to the Obligations
or to pursue any other remedy in Lender's power....
4.2. Remedies. Upon the occurrence of an Event of
Default, Lender shall have the option, but not the obligation,
to declare this Guarantee in default and thereupon Lender is
authorized to demand and receive from Guarantor the
unconditional, prompt payment or performance, as the case
may be, of the Guaranteed Obligations. In addition to the
rights and remedies provided in this Guarantee, Lender shall
further have the right to exercise any and all other applicable
legal or equitable rights and remedies....
R. at 273.
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3.

The Trust Deed was recorded in the public records of Davis County, Utah

and pledged Harmer's Bountiful, Utah, home as collateral to secure payment of the
indebtedness of the Note. R. at 271.
4.

Harmer made several payments on the loan. However, as of September 22,

1999, he failed to repay the full balance, including interest and fees, owed under the Note
and informed Machock that he was not in a position to make any further payments. R. at
465.

Although Harmer again commenced payments to Machock on the Note in

approximately March, 2001, the last payment was received by Machock in September,
2001. R. at 318-20.
5.

By letter dated October 4, 1999, David Detton, prior counsel for Machock,

informed Gregory Barrick of Durham, Jones & Pinegar, counsel for Fink, that Machock
would be filing a complaint against Fink to enforce the Guarantee agreement, enclosing a
copy of Machock's Complaint, and also informed Mr. Barrick that "[a]s a courtesy to Mr.
Fink and to avoid further delay in proceeding against the property securing the Note, Mr.
Machock has instructed me to commence default proceedings under the Trust Deed.
Again, these proceedings are being commenced as a courtesy to Mr. Fink and in no way
waive or constitute a prerequisite to Mr. Machock's demand for immediate payment of
all amounts due by Mr. Fink under his Guarantee." R. at 465-66.
6.

On October 15, 1999, Machock filed suit against Fink for payment on the

Guarantee. R. at 498.
7.

On February 29, 2000, Machock foreclosed on Harmer's second priority

Trust Deed by holding a trustee's sale. R. at 283. 'This trustee's sale was commenced
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after the Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale had been given as required by
Utah Code Ann. § § 57-1-24 and 25." R. at 201, f 9. Fink was informed of the trustee's
sale, but did not bid at the sale. R. at 498. Machock submitted the only bid at the
foreclosure sale, which was a credit bid of $1,000 subject to the outstanding obligation
owed under the pending foreclosure of the first priority trust deed held by Brighton Bank
in the amount of approximately $300,000. Machock therefore took title to the real
property subject to the pending foreclosure of the first priority trust deed. R. at 283; 28687.
8.

By letter dated April 18, 2000, David Detton, prior counsel for Machock,

informed Gregory Barrick of Durham, Jones & Pinegar, counsel for Fink, that "you are
aware that a notice of default has been filed against the former Harmer property by the
holder of the first trust deed [Brighton Bank]." R. at 463. Counsel for Fink was also
informed:
Although Mr. Machock has completed his foreclosure
proceedings under his trust deed and has listed the property
for sale with the same realtor who has the listing on Mr.
Machock's former residence in the same area, there can be no
assurance that a buyer can be found for the former Harmer
residence before foreclosure proceedings under the first trust
deed are completed.
Please be advised that Mr. Machock is not in a position to
make any payments to cure the default under the first trust
deed, to advance any additional sums to purchase the
underlying obligation or otherwise to provide any financial
consideration to extend the period before foreclosure. You
should also be aware that the consideration provided by Mr.
Machock at the foreclosure proceedings on his trust deed was
limited to a credit bid in the amount of the outstanding
obligations under the first trust deed. In the event the first
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trust deed is foreclosed, Mr. Machock will continue to seek
recovery under Mr. Fink's guarantee for the entire amount of
the deficiency represented by Mr. Harmer's note, together
with his costs incurred in enforcing the guarantee.
Again, Mr. Machock would strongly encourage Mr. Fink to
reconsider his position with respect to mitigating his damages
by performing his obligations under the guarantee and taking
an assignment of Mr. Machock's position in the former
Harmer property and in Mr. Harmer's note. Mr. Fink will
then be in a position to make such arrangements, if any, as he
deems appropriate with the holder of the first trust deed prior
to the completion of the foreclosure. He will also then be in a
position to preserve and capture whatever value may be
available from the Harmer property in excess of the amount
of the first trust deed lien and to pursue a deficiency action
for any remaining balance directly against Mr. Harmer.
R. at 463-64.
9.

Shortly after the April 18, 2000 letter, the holder of the first trust deed

[Brighton Bank] foreclosed on the Harmer property. R. at 531, Tr. at pp. 24-25.
10.

On July 31, 2000, a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release was signed

between Machock and Harmer in exchange for a Stipulation for Confession of Judgment.
R. at 498.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Fink's liability to Machock pursuant to the absolute Guarantee was fixed on
September 22, 1999, the date Harmer defaulted on the Note and informed Machock that
he was unable to make future payments. Nothing in section 57-1-32 changes this result.
Rather, section 57-1-32 simply provides the means by which Machock, having elected to
foreclose the Harmer' Trust Deed, can now pursue his breach of contract claim against
Fink.
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The trial court correctly recognized that Machock's Complaint states a valid cause
of action for breach of contract against Fink. It was only on February 29, 2000, the date
the property was foreclosed by Machock, that section 57-1-32 became activated.
However, rather than require Machock to go through the tedious and inefficient process
of amending his Complaint to allege the restrictions of that section, the trial court
correctly applied the restrictions of the statute to Machock's breach of contract action.
Fink argues that under section 57-1-32, Machock had to file a second Complaint,
or amend the original Complaint, within three-months of the trustee's sale to allege the
restrictions of section 57-1-32. This argument is incorrect. Nothing in section 57-1-32
addresses the contractual arrangement between Machock and Fink, nor does it constitute
an absolute bar to a prior filed Complaint asserting a valid cause of action on a guaranty
of payment. Requiring Machock to file a new case directly against Fink, which would
presumably simply be consolidated with the original action, would not only be a waste of
the parties' and court's time, but would not further the purpose of the statute. Requiring
Machock to amend the original Complaint within the three-month limitation was also
unnecessary. Based on the pleadings, the deficiency was at issue both before and after
the trustee's sale. Moreover, after the trial court's Ruling and prior to the Utah Supreme
Court granting this interlocutory appeal, Machock responded to Fink's discovery by
addressing the restrictions of section 57-1-32.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the primary purpose of section 57-1-32 is
satisfied when there is notice to the debtor that a creditor will pursue a deficiency after
foreclosure of the property. Notice to the debtor has never been interpreted by statute,
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case law, or otherwise, as not being satisfied when, as in this action, the creditor has
placed the debtor on notice of the deficiency prior to and after the foreclosure and as
acknowledged both before and after the foreclosure in the debtor's pleadings.
The trial court correctly ruled that Machock met the purpose of section 57-1-32 by
providing numerous notices to Fink that Machock would pursue a deficiency: (1) in
correspondence to Fink's counsel on October 4, 1999; (2) in Machock's Complaint; (3) in
correspondence to Fink's counsel on April 18, 2000; and (4) in Machock's Reply to
Fink's Amended Counterclaim. Any of these examples, along with Machock's responses
to Fink's discovery requests specifically addressing the restrictions of section 57-1-32,
would alone satisfy the purpose of section 57-1-32. Taken together, these notices leave
no doubt that Machock amply satisfied section 57-1-32, eliminating the need for
Machock to file a second lawsuit, or amend the original Complaint, to set forth the
restrictions of section 57-1-32.
Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court's Ruling that Machock's
Complaint states a valid cause of action against Fink for breach of contract, Machock
complied with the purpose of section 57-1-32 and the restrictions in section 57-1-32
apply to Machock's suit against Fink for payment on the Guarantee.
ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MACHOCK'S
COMPLAINT STATES A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST FINK.
Fink moved for summary judgment based on the First Defense in his Amended

Answer that Machock's Complaint failed to state a claim against Fink for which relief
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could be granted.3

R. at 195-97.

The trial court correctly ruled that Machock's

Complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of contract against Fink. In the
Ruling, the trial court states:
The Court recognizes that this is an absolute, as opposed to a
conditional guarantee. Carrier Brokers, Inc. v., Spanish Trail,
751 P.2d 258, 261 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("An absolute
guaranty is defined as a guaranty of the payment of an
obligation without words of limitation or condition... A
conditional guaranty exists when its terms import some
condition precedent to the liability of the guarantor.") The
Guarantee language is clear and specific, stating that "[tjhis
guarantee is of payment and performance and not of
collection, and is primary, not secondary, in nature."
Guarantee, article L Machock is correct in arguing that he
may directly pursue the payment of the $150,000 without
taking legal action against Harmer. In fact, Machock filed
suit against Fink on October 15, 1999, well before taking
legal action against Harmer. However, on February 29, 2000,
Machock did foreclose on the trust deed on Harmer's
property.
R. at 500.
Machock's breach of contract claim is based on the absolute Guarantee and is
therefore independent of any deficiency claim. Indeed, Fink provided no security for the
Guarantee. Because the Guarantee was absolute, Machock was not required to pursue
other remedies against Harmer or Harmer's collateral before proceeding directly against
Fink. Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way Concrete, 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah Ct App.
1987) (holding a guaranty of payment is "absolute, and the guaranteed party need not fix
Interestingly, even after Fink's trustee's sale held on February 29, 2000, the October 11,
2000 Amended Answer does not include an affirmative defense that Machock's
Complaint is barred under section 57-1-32 for its failure to file a second Complaint
within the three-month limitation period or for its failure to allege the restrictions of
section 57-1-32. R. at 84-105.
<;Anni£ i
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its losses by pursuing its remedies against the debtor or the security before proceeding
directly against the guarantor." ).
An absolute guaranty of payment has been recognized as a separate obligation
from a note and trust deed. In re SLC Limited V., 152 B.R. 755, 770 (D. Utah 1993). In
SLC Limited V, a secured creditor of the debtor amended its complaint to seek a claim
against the debtor's guarantors. The bankruptcy court held that because the guarantors
were not co-obligors on the debt secured by the property, they could be sued
independently from the debtor's obligation under the note and trust deed, reasoning,
"[t]he Guaranty Agreement significantly enlarged [the guarantors'] liability on the debt.
[The guarantors'] status . . . was not the equivalent status of co-obligors on the underlying
debt." Id at 770-71. This principal demonstrates the soundness of the trial court's Ruling
that Machock stated a valid breach of contract claim against Fink based on the Guarantee
because Fink's obligation pursuant to the Guarantee is entirely distinct from Harmer's
obligation pursuant to his Note and the Trust Deed.
In his brief, Fink ignores the trial court's Ruling that Machock's Complaint states
a valid cause of action. Instead, Fink argues that section 57-1-32 is an absolute bar to
Machock's Complaint to enforce the Guarantee because Machock did not file a second
Complaint, or amend the original Complaint, within three-months of the trustee's sale of
Harmer's Trust Deed to assert the restrictions of section 57-1-32. Fink's argument is
incorrect. It ignores the effect of the prior filed Complaint and attempts to sidestep the
Utah Supreme Court's stated purpose of section 57-1-32. Moreover, Fink's argument is
belied by the fact that he knew Machock would seek a deficiency against him. Not only
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did Machock send numerous notices to Fink stating that Machock would pursue a
deficiency, but Fink's own pleadings unquestionably demonstrate he was aware of the
foreclosure and deficiency.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SECTION 57-1-32
DOES NOT BAR MACHOCK'S COMPLAINT.
Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code states:
At any time within three months after any sale of property
under a trust deed as provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24
and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security, and in that action the complaint shall set
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was secured
by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold,
and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale.
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair
market value of the property at the date of sale. The court
may not render judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of
the sale. In any action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2003).
Section 57-1-32 does not address the situation between Machock and Fink.
Nowhere does section 57-1-32 purport to address the rights and obligations of Fink's
Guarantee, nor does section 57-1-52 purport to address the effect of a prior filed lawsuit
based on an obligation represented by a guaranty of payment.
A simple review of the statutory language establishes that ". . . an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was
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given as security . . . ." Applying the statute to the instant action establishes that the
obligation for which the trust deed was given as security is the Harmer' Note and Trust
Deed, not Fink's Guarantee. The Trust Deed was not given as security for the Guarantee,
but rather the Trust Deed was given as security for the Note.
The trial court correctly ruled that section 57-1-32 was not an absolute bar to
Machock's Complaint. In the Ruling, the trial court states:
This court could provide Machock with an opportunity to
amend his Complaint to conform to the parameters of §57-132, however, a more efficient approach would simply apply
the restrictions of the statute to the current complaint. Under
the "more sensible view" of Kirkbride, the Act is satisfied
when "notice" is given to the debtor. Machock filed a
complaint against Fink prior to the foreclosure, informed Fink
of the foreclosure sale, and has been in fairly regular contact
with Fink regarding the suit, the damage, and any potential
deficiencies. This Court rules that the three month notice and
filing requirement has been well satisfied by Machock, and
although Machock's action is now governed by the terms of
§ 57-1-32, he may now proceed having fulfilled the three
month filing requirement.
R. at 503.
The primary purpose of section 57-1-32 is to provide notice to the debtor that a
deficiency will be pursued by the lender after foreclosure of the property. Standard
Federal Savings & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1991). As explained
by the Utah Supreme Court in Kirkbride, "[a] more sensible view of the operation of the
three-month limitation period contained in section 57-1-32 is that its primary purpose is
satisfied when the foreclosing party provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be
sought by filing the action." Id. at 1138.
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The Utah Supreme Court has never interpreted section 57-1-32 to be an absolute
bar to a prior filed action by a lender against a guarantor. In Kirkbride, the defendants,
like Fink, argued that the purpose of section 57-1-32 is to "bar any action not initiated
within three months and then resolved on the merits for the plaintiff." IdL at 1138. The
Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "there is nothing in the language of the
statute suggesting an intent to reach such a draconian result." Id. Further explaining its
holding that section 57-1-32 did not bar the plaintiffs complaint, the Court stated:
In the absence of such a plain expression of intent, we have
generally read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit
as establishing only procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that
can be cleared, rather than absolute bars to suit. . . . We
conclude that section 57-1-32 does not permanently bar
further proceedings anytime some procedural failing results in
the dismissal of a properly filed action....
The relevant inquiry is whether the legislature made plain an
intention to bar forever claims of those who are guilty of a
procedural misstep. (Citations omitted) As previously noted,
we find no such intention here. A more sensible view of the
operation of the three-month limitation period contained in
section 57-1-32 is that its primary purpose is satisfied when
the foreclosing party provides notice to the debtor that a
deficiency will be sought by filing the action.
Id. (emphasis added). See also C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victims' Reparations, 966
P.2d 1226, 1228-1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (applying the analysis in Kirkbride to
savings statute and holding because plaintiff timely filed original complaint, defendant
was placed on notice of plaintiff's intent to seek judicial review of administrative
decision).
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The Utah Court of Appeals has similarly held that section 57-1-32 is not an
absolute bar to an action against junior notes and trust deeds which by nonjudicial
foreclosure become unsecured. In G. Adams Limited Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P.2d
962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the plaintiffs held a note executed by the defendants which
was secured by a trust deed, which was junior to a trust deed which was foreclosed
nonjudicially. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' action to collect the full amount
due on their note was barred because it was not commenced within three months of the
trustee's sale conducted pursuant to the senior trust deed.

This Court disagreed,

reasoning that the plain language of section 57-1-32 "clearly indicates the statute limits
only the rights of the beneficiary under the trust deed that was foreclosed—it does not
affect the rights and obligations of parties to other trust deeds." Id. at 963.4 Accordingly,
"[t]he statute does not purport to address the status of obligations secured by junior trust
deeds following a trustee sale pursuant to a senior trust deed." IcL at 964.
Fink's reliance on Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services Inc., 743 P.2d
1158 (Utah 1987), Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985) and Surety Life Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995) is therefore wholly misplaced. None of these cases
involved a separate claim for liability on an absolute guaranty that was filed prior to the
foreclosure.

Rather, those cases dealt with situations in which the lender pursued a

deficiency against the borrowers or guarantors after the foreclosure. This is not the case

4

The plain language of section 57-1-32 referred to by the Court states that "an action
may be commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security." Durbano, 782 P.2d at 963 (emphasis in original).
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here. Because Machock's Complaint was filed before the foreclosure and four months
before the sale, those cases are inapposite.5
Fink is likewise mistaken that Durbano supports his claim that Machock's
Complaint should be barred.

In fact, the Durbano Court specifically held that the

defendants' interpretation of the statute, like Fink's:
[w]ould work anomalous results in several situations. For
example, if a senior trust deed was foreclosed nonjudicially,
the beneficiary of a junior trust deed would have only three
months to bring an action on the note formally secured by his
or her trust deed. But what if that note was not in default? In
appellants' view, the beneficiary would still have only three
months to bring an action even though no action could be
brought if no default existed. If the debtor could stay current
for those three months, he or she could then cease making any
payments whatsoever with absolute impunity.
Id.

5

Fink likewise attempts to make much of the fact that at the March 6, 2003 hearing on
his motion for summary judgment, counsel for Machock argued that this suit against Fink
was not a deficiency. Br. of Appellant at 10-11. This argument from counsel, however,
is not evidence, see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993), and did not matter
to the trial court, "in light of the very broad, very expansive reading given to the statute
by the Utah Supreme Court." R. at 501. More importantly, it is irrelevant under the trial
court's Ruling that Machock could still pursue his breach of contract claim against Fink,
subject to the restrictions of section 57-1-32. R. at 500. In fact, counsel's isolated
statement is taken entirely out of context. Although counsel for Machock informed the
trial court that "[t]his suit is an action to enforce a guarantee of payment and contractual
rights," R. at 531, Tr. p. 22, counsel went on to state, "[t]hat is a distinct difference
between bringing a deficiency claim within three months after a foreclosure sale. This
suit existed prior in time as the Court knows to the sale." R. at 531, Trans, p. 23.
Accordingly, counsel's statements merely demonstrate that this action is distinct from
those in First Sec. Realty, Green, and Surety Life because here, Machock had already
filed a Complaint. In fact, at the hearing, counsel for Machock acknowledged that
Machock would be precluded from obtaining a double recovery on his breach of contract
claim. R. at 531, Tr. p. 27 ("[w]hat happened in this one situation is fine, you cannot get
a double recovery in a windfall. . . .").
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An application of these principals in Durbano illustrates the futility of Fink's
proposed interpretation of the statute as an absolute bar, especially with a pending action
against an absolute Guarantee agreement. If, as in Durbano, the statute does not affect
the rights and obligations of parties to other trust deeds, sound logic dictates that it
likewise does not apply to a prior filed Complaint asserting a valid cause of action under
an absolute Guarantee agreement.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED SECTION 57-1-32 TO
MACHOCK'S COMPLAINT.
The trial court correctly ruled that section 57-1-32 became activated once the

trustee's sale of Harmer's Trust Deed occurred on February 29, 2000. R. at 500. Relying
on Kirkbride, the trial court recognized that the three-month limitation period of section
57-1-32 is a mere procedural hurdle and the purpose of section 57-1-32 of providing Fink
with notice that Machock would pursue a deficiency had been well satisfied by Machock.
R. at 502-03. The trial court noted that it could provide Machock with an opportunity to
amend his Complaint to conform to the parameters of section 57-1-32, but found that a
more efficient approach would be to simply apply the restrictions of the statute to the
current Complaint. R. at 503.
The record is replete with examples of Machock placing Fink on notice that he
would pursue a deficiency against Fink, thereby satisfying the purpose of section 57-132. These notices to Fink are both before and after the February 29, 2000 trustee's sale.
In addition, Fink conveniently ignores the effect of the prior filing of Machock's
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Complaint and his own pleadings placing the foreclosure of the Harmer' property at
issue.
First, before even filing the Complaint on October 15, 1999, David Detton, prior
counsel for Machock, sent a letter dated October 4, 1999 to Gregory Barrick of Durham,
Jones & Pinegar, counsel for Fink, placing Fink on notice that Machock would be filing
an action and pursuing a deficiency against Fink. R. at 465-66. Counsel for Machock
also enclosed a courtesy copy of Machock's Complaint with this letter and was informed
that "Mr. Machock has instructed me to commence default proceedings under the Trust
Deed." R. at 465.
Second, Machock's Complaint against Fink for breach of contract was filed on
October 15, 1999. R. at 1-3. In the Complaint, filed four months before the trustee's
sale, Machock alleged that Fink was liable under the Guarantee for the full amount of the
Note. R. at 2-3.
Third, in Fink's January 10, 2000 Answer and Counterclaim, Fink acknowledges
that he was aware that the deficiency was an issue, asserting in his Answer that Machock
seek foreclosure of the collateral pledged by Harmer and that Machock's claim is barred
by the one action rule and by Machock's failure to exhaust the collateral that secures the
Note. R. at 7-8. Likewise, in his Counterclaim, Fink alleges that he is entitled to a
declaratory judgment that Machock must first seek to foreclose upon and otherwise
exhaust the real property collateral pledged by Harmer to secure his obligations under the
Note before he can seek to recover from Fink any unsatisfied obligation under the Note.
R. at 15, 19.
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Fourth, in a second letter, dated April 18, 2000, Fink's counsel was informed that
"[although Mr. Machock has completed his foreclosure proceedings under his trust deed
and has listed the property for sale... there can be no assurance that a buyer can be found
for the former Harmer residence before foreclosure proceedings under the first trust deed
are completed." R. at 464. This same letter also informed Fink of the following:
Please be advised that Mr. Machock is not in a position to
make any payments to cure the default under the first trust
deed, to advance any additional sums to purchase the
underlying obligation or otherwise to provide any financial
consideration to extend the period before foreclosure. You
should also be aware that the consideration provided by Mr.
Machock at the foreclosure proceedings on his trust deed was
limited to a credit bid in the amount of the outstanding
obligations under the first trust deed. In the event the first
trust deed is foreclosed, Mr. Machock will continue to seek
recovery under Mr. Fink's guarantee for the entire amount of
the deficiency represented by Mr. Harmer's note, together
with his costs incurred in enforcing the guarantee.
R. at 464. Finally, counsel for Machock invited counsel for Fink to "strongly encourage
Mr. Fink to reconsider his position with respect to mitigating his damages by performing
his obligations under the Guarantee and taking an assignment of Mr. Machock's position
in the former Harmer property and in Mr. Harmer's note." R. at 464. Despite this
invitation, Fink failed to take any action to protect his interests as the guarantor of
Harmer's obligation.
Fifth, on October 11, 2000, Fink filed an Amended Answer, Counterclaim and
Third Party Complaint.

R. at 84-106.

In his Amended Answer, Fink asserts that

Machock's claim is barred for failure to mitigate, and that Fink's obligation "should be
reduced by the fair market value of the real property upon which Machock foreclosed."
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R. at 89. Similarly, in his Amended Counterclaim, Fink asserts that he is entitled to a
declaratory judgment that Machock's only recourse ('is the foreclosure on the real
property pledged by Harmer which Machock has pursued, and to pursue repayment
from Harmer." R. at 98 (emphasis added).
Finally, on October 31, 2000, Machock filed a Reply to Fink's Amended
Counterclaim. R. at 247-60. In paragraph 26 of his Reply, Machock asserts in response
to Fink's allegation that Machock claims a right to recover from Fink the full amount of
the Note regardless of whether Machock has foreclosed the real property, that "this issue
has been mooted by the completion of foreclosure proceedings against the Harmer
residence, which failed to yield any funds to satisfy Machock's lien when Machock was
unable to sell the Harmer residence before the foreclosure of the prior first trust deed."
R. at 255. Machock further asserts in his Eighth Affirmative Defense to Fink's Amended
Counterclaim that:
Defendant's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by his
failure to mitigate damages, including without limitation
Defendant's failure to accept the tender of the Trust Deed,
Defendant's failure to accept the tender of the opportunity to
direct the marketing and sale of the Harmer residence,
Defendant's failure to accept the tender of the opportunity to
maintain and repair the Harmer residence pending its sale to
preserve the fair market value of the property, Defendant's
failure to respond with reasonable promptness to potential
offers to purchase the Harmer residence, and Defendant's
failure to accept the tender of the Judgment by Confession
entered against Harmer.
R. at 258.

This evidence undeniably demonstrates that Fink possessed notice of the
foreclosure and Machock's intent to pursue a deficiency, satisfying the purpose of section
57-1-32. Fink contends that, despite these numerous notices, Machock's Complaint
should be dismissed because Machock did not present any evidence that he had informed
Fink about the time and place of the foreclosure sale. Br. of Appellant at p. 14, n3. The
Court's reasoning in Kirkbride disposes of this argument. Further, Fink admitted in his
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment that notice of the time and
place of the trustee's sale was properly provided pursuant to section 57-1-25 of the Utah
Code.6 R. at 201. Section 57-1-32 does not require that that lender actually inform the
debtor of the time and place of the sale. Because Machock provided the required notice
on numerous occasions, as explained above, Fink is unable to demonstrate any prejudice
resulting from the restrictions of section 57-1-32 imposed on Machock's Complaint.
IV.

FINK'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS THAT MACHOCK'S COMPLAINT
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION
57-1-32 ARE MERITLESS.
Fink makes several additional arguments to support his claim that the trial court's

Ruling should be reversed. Each argument lacks merit.

6

Section 57-1-25 provides that "[t]he trustee shall give written notice of the time and
place of sale particularly describing the property to be sold: (a) by publication of the
notice. . . and (b) by posting the notice: (i) at least 20 days before the date of sale is
scheduled; and (ii) (A) in some conspicuous place on the property to be sold: . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-25 (2003). Recital of this required notice in the trustee's deed is prima
facie evidence of compliance with the notice requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-128 (2)(c)(i) (2003) ("The recitals . . . constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with
Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36....).
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A.

The Trial Court Did Not Sua Sponte Remedy A Pleading Defect.

Fink complains that the trial court's Ruling has sua sponte "turn[ed] the complaint
into something that it could not be: a timely-filed claim for a deficiency."

Br. of

Appellant at 10-12. The Ruling did no such thing. Rather, as demonstrated above, the
trial court properly ruled that Machock's Complaint stated a valid claim for breach of
contract against Fink, Machock's notices to Fink met the purpose of section 57-1-32 and
the restrictions in section 57-1-32 would be applied to Machock's suit against Fink for
payment on the Guarantee.

R. at 501. Fink's reliance on Wells v. Arch Hurley

Conservancy Dist, 89 N.M. 516, 554 P.2d 678 (N.M. 1976) and Kaiserman Assocs., Inc.
v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1998) for this proposition is therefore
misplaced, as the trial court did not sua sponte remedy a pleading defect.
Fink was on notice of Machock's intent to seek a deficiency against him and in
fact actually placed the deficiency at issue.

In his Answer, Fink asserts that he

"demanded that Machock seek foreclosure of the collateral pledged by Harmer to secure
the loan," that "Machock's purported claim for relief in his Complaint is barred by the
one action rule," and that "Machock's purported claim for relief is barred by his failure to
exhaust the collateral that secures the Note and by the provisions of the One Action Rule,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1996)."

R. at 7-8.

Fink also raised this issue in his

Counterclaim by alleging that he is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Machock must
first seek to foreclose upon and otherwise exhaust the real property collateral pledged by
Harmer to secure his obligations under the Note before he can seek to recover from Fink
any unsatisfied obligation under the Note. R. at 15, 19.

560016 1

^0

Fink also asserts similar affirmative defenses in his Amended Answer, contending
that Machock failed to mitigate his damages and, in particular, that Fink's obligations
pursuant to the Guarantee "should be reduced by the fair market value of the real
property upon which Machock foreclosed/' R. at 89. His Amended Counterclaim also
asserts that he is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Machock's only recourse "is the
foreclosure on the real property pledged by Harmer which Machock has pursued, and to
pursue repayment from Harmer." R. at 98 (emphasis added).
In his responses to Machock's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests For
Production of Documents dated January 29, 2001, Fink again placed the deficiency at
issue when he informed Machock that Fink "has retained Marty Bodell to give an opinion
as to the fair market value of the Harmer residence as of February 2000. Fink will
produce a copy of Mr. Bodell's written appraisal which states the substance of Mr.
Bodell's opinion and the basis for that opinion." See Addendum, Exhibit "A."
In his responses to Fink's discovery requests addressing the restrictions of section
57-1-32, Machock informed Fink that he believed the fair market value of the Harmer
property as of the date of sale to be $308,613.38, informed Fink how he calculated that
figure, and that Machock submitted a credit bid of $1,000 over the amount due pursuant
to the first priority deed of trust.7 It is now within the province of the court, pursuant to
section 57-1-32 to determine the amount Fink owes under the Guarantee, the sale price of

7

Fink's statement that "[t]o date, Machock has not informed Fink what the fair market
value is or the amount of any alleged deficiency," Br. of Appellant at p. 14, n3, is a
misrepresentation of the record.
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the Harmer property, and the fair market value of the Harmer property at the date of sale.
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2003) ("Before rendering judgment, the court shall find
the fair market value of the property at the date of sale.").
In short, Fink's affirmative defenses in his pleadings and discovery demonstrate
that Machock's intent to claim a deficiency was at issue in this case. Thus, there was no
need for Machock to amend his Complaint or file a second Complaint to add a deficiency
o

claim. Fink can demonstrate no prejudice resulting from the Ruling and the restrictions
of section 57-1-32 imposed on Machock's Complaint. As Fink possessed notice of the
foreclosure and Machock's intent to seek a deficiency, the trial court's Ruling should be
affirmed.
B.

Kirkbride's Analysis Of Section 57-1-32 Is Applicable To This Case,

Fink contends that Machock is not the victim of a "procedural failing" since "he
never filed an action under section 57-1-32 in the first place." Br. of Appellant at 15.
Funk's argument lacks merit. It ignores the prior filed Complaint and the Utah Supreme
Assuming the deficiency issue was not raised by the pleadings, Machock did not need to
file an Amended Complaint or a second Complaint for an additional reason. Rule 15(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for amendment of the pleadings to conform
to the evidence. Based on Fink's affirmative defenses in his Amended Answer and
discovery to date, including Machock's responses to Fink's interrogatories addressing the
restrictions of section 57-1-32, the deficiency issue will be tried without any prejudice to
Fink "by express or implied consent of the parties." Id See also Armed Forces
Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, %f 24-25, 70 P.3d 35, 42 (Utah 2003). In
Harrison, the plaintiff failed to allege its fraud claim against the defendant with
particularity. At trial, however, the defendant presented evidence in her own defense on
this issue. Id at f 24, 70 P.3d at 42. On appeal, the Court held that, pursuant to Rule
15(b), because the defendant "knew about the fraud allegations against her and was able
to present her own evidence at trial to challenge those allegations, she was not prejudiced
by the technical failings of [the plaintiff's] pleadings." Id.
o^

Court's analysis of section 57-1-32 in Kirkbride. Using that analysis, the trial court
recognized, "[t]his court could provide Machock with an opportunity to amend his
Complaint to conform to the parameters of § 57-1-32, however, a more efficient approach
would simply apply the restrictions of the statute to the current complaint." R. at 502.
The trial court correctly concluded that the more efficient approach would be to simply
apply the restrictions to Machock's Complaint against Fink for breach of contract.
C.

Machock's Notices And Responses To Fink's Discovery Concerning
The Restrictions Of Section 57-1-32 Satisfies The Statute,

Fink argues that Machock's Complaint is barred because "he has never given
notice in any pleading of the foreclosure sale, the amount for which the property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of the sale, all elements that must be
pled in a complaint, according to section 57-1-32." Br. Of Appellant at 15 (emphasis
added). This argument is incorrect for several reasons. First, the argument that Machock
was required to give notice in a pleading of the foreclosure sale ignores the purpose of
section 57-1-32 as discussed in Kirkbride, and Machock's numerous notices sent to Fink
both before and after the foreclosure.

See discussion at p. 25-29, including note 6.

Second, Machock has in fact provided Fink with a pleading addressing the restrictions of
section 57-1-32 in Machock's responses to Fink's specific interrogatories addressing the
restrictions of section 57-1-32.9 See Addendum, Exhibit B.

In addition, after placing the deficiency at issue in his pleadings, Fink's argument
ignores his lack of diligence in pursuing discovery on his affirmative defenses addressing
the deficiency. Fink failed to conduct any discovery on the restrictions of section 57-132, including the particulars of the foreclosure sale of the Harmer' Trust Deed held on
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Under Fink's theory, the only way Machock could pursue his breach of contract
claim prior to foreclosure of the property would be to independently file a second lawsuit
pleading the requirements of section 57-1-32, despite the fact that the foreclosure sale at
the time of filing the Complaint had not yet occurred. This reasoning defies sound logic
and is completely unnecessary. As succinctly stated in Kirkbride, the creditor "must
promptly put the debtor on notice as to whether it will seek any balance due by
commencing an action. Once this notice is given or the three-month time period runs,
the debtor can plan accordingly."

Kirkbride, 821 P.2d at 1138. (emphasis added).10

Here, Machock filed "an action" when he filed his Complaint against Fink for breach of
contract. Fink never addresses why it would be necessary to have two complaints on file.
To require Machock to file a second new case against Fink, which would presumably
simply be consolidated with the original action, would be a waste of the parties' and the
court's time and would not further any of the goals of the statute as articulated by the
Kirkbride court.
D.

The Trial Court's Ruling Will Not Allow Lenders To Ignore The
Notice Requirements Of Section 57-1-32,

Lastly, Fink complains that under the trial court's interpretation of Kirkbride,
lenders would be permitted to ignore the statutory requirement of section 57-1-32 and
guarantors would be deprived of affirmative defenses since they would not be on notice

February 29, 2000 until April 3, 2003, after the trial court denied his motion for summary
judgment. R. at 513.
10

In fact, section 57-1-32 states that "[a]t any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed . . . an action may be commenced to recover the balance
due . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2003) (emphasis added).
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of the foreclosure sale when answering the Complaint. Br. of Appellant, p. 18-19. These
arguments are not only pure speculation, but completely unfounded.
The trial court's interpretation of Kirkbride was correct. Under that interpretation,
lenders will not be permitted to ignore section 57-1-32 and guarantors will not be
deprived of affirmative defenses. Because of the evidence that Fink had actual notice of
the foreclosure and deficiency claim, the trial court ruled that rather than force Machock
to go through the tedious process of amending his Complaint to include the claim, "a
more efficient approach would simply apply the restrictions of the statute to the
complaint." R. at 503. The Ruling has the same effect as allowing Machock to amend
his Complaint to include the deficiency claim.
The Ruling does not preclude Fink from asserting affirmative defenses to the
restrictions of section 57-1-32 now being applied to Machock's suit against Fink for
payment on the Guarantee. This case has not been set for trial, and, although Fink could
seek to amend his Amended Answer, asserting any additional defenses to Machock's
deficiency claim, he has not done so but rather chose to pursue discovery on the
restrictions of section 57-1-32. In sum, lenders will still be required to comply with
section 57-1-32 by providing actual notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be sought
after a foreclosure sale.
CONCLUSION
The Ruling should accordingly be affirmed.
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
David W. Tufts (8736)
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500
Attorneys for Bill Fink

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND
SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

JOSEPH MACHOCK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARL WILLIAM ("BILL") FINK,

Civil No. 990700380

Defendants.
Hon. Darwin C. Hansen

CARL WILLIAM ("BILL") FINK,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
V.

JOSEPH MACHOCK,
Counterclaim Defendant.
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Bill Fink ("Fink") hereby responds to the Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents served by Joseph Machock ("Machock"), as follows:
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORIES
Preliminary Statement
Fink's responses to these interrogatories are neither admissions nor acknowledgments
that the information revealed is relevant to the subject matter of this action. Each of these
responses is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and
admissibility, and any and all other objections and grounds which would require the exclusion of
any statement herein if the interrogatories were asked of, or any statement contained herein were
made by, a witness present and testifying in court, all of which objections and grounds are
reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.
Except for explicit facts stated herein, no incidental or implied admissions are intended
hereby. The fact that Fink has answered any interrogatory should not be taken as an admission
that either of them accept or admit the existence of any fact set forth or assumed by such
interrogatory, or that such response constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Fink has
answered a part or all of any interrogatory is not intended and shall not be construed to be a
waiver of all or any part of their objection to any interrogatory.
Fink's investigation and discovery with regard to this litigation are not yet completed and
are continuing. The following responses are given without prejudice to Fink's rights to
supplement these responses, produce evidence of any subsequently discovered facts before trial if
Fink should discovery additional facts after service of these responses.
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General Objections
Fink makes the following general objections to these interrogatories. Every general
objection applies to each and every interrogatory and is incorporated into each response herein.
The assertion of the same, similar or additional objections or the provision of partial answers in
the individual responses to these interrogatories does not waive any of Fink's general objections
or limit the applicability or effect of these general objections to that particular interrogatory or
any other interrogatory.
A.

Fink objects to these interrogatories to the extent they impose requirements

different or greater than those set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B.

Fink objects to each interrogatory to the extent that it calls for information

protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product
doctrine.
C.

Fink objects to each interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information not in

Fink's possession, custody or control.
D.

Fink objects to the interrogatories to the extent they impose an obligation on him

to provide a response or produce information for, or on behalf of, any person or entity other than
himself.
R

Fink objects to each interrogatory to the extent that it seeks information more

readily or equally available to the Machock.
F.

Fink objects that these interrogatories are collectively vexatious, harassing and

annoying. Most of these interrogatories are repetitive of discovery that Machock has already
conducted in this action.
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These objections are incorporated into each of the following responses.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1
Interrogatory
If you contend, as set forth in Paragraph 8 of your Answer to the Complaint, that the
Guarantee is not of payment and performance and is not primary in nature, please state all facts
that support such contention.
Response
Among the other defenses raised in Fink's Amended Answer, Fink contends that the
Guarantee is invalid because it was procured by Machock's fraud. As such, it is not a guarantee
of payment and performance and it is not primary in nature. The factual basis for Fink's
contentions in this regard are recited in response to interrogatory no. 4, below. See Fink's
response to interrogatory no. 4.
INTERROGATORY NO, 2
Interrogatory
Please state all facts that support your contention as averred in Paragraph 10 of the
Answer to the Complaint that Machock has failed and refused to take adequate steps to enforce
Harmer's obligation under the Note.
Response
This allegation is supported by the fact that Machock has not undertake any serious effort
to enforce Harmer's obligation under the Note. Fink has been unable to discover evidence of any
effort undertaken by Machock to enforce Harmer's obligation under the note.
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For example, on July 31, 2000, Machock expressly released Harmer from his obligations
under the Note. The Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release expressly reserves Machock's
right to seek satisfaction of Harmer's obligation "through judicial liens on any assets or property
acquired by Harmer in the future." However, even though Harmer recently stated that he has a
steady income and can pay Machock $10,000 down and $3,000 per month, Machock has not
undertaken any effort to garnish or otherwise collect this income from Harmer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3
Interrogatory
Please state all facts that support your contentions as averred in Paragraph 11 of the
Answer to the Complaint that "Harmer is not without resources to pay all or a portion of the
amount due under the note."
Response
Harmer testified during his deposition that he wished to sell the house and give the equity
from the sale to Machock in partial satisfaction of Harmer's obligation to Machock. On
November 29,1999, Keith Cook offered to pay $390,000 to purchase the house. This would
have generated approximately $80,000 in equity to pay down Harmer's obligation. On
approximately January 28, 2000, an unidentified "prospective buyer" offered to pay $350,000 to
purchase the house. This would have generated approximately $40,000 in equity to pay down
Harmer's obligation.
Harmer testified during his deposition that he has numerous business opportunities which
he expects to produce income sufficient to pay all or a portion of Harmer's obligation to
Machock.
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Harmer is presently the beneficiary of an employment contract which, according to
Harmer, allows him to pay$3,000 per month to Machock. Fink does not at the present time
know the total amount of money that Harmer receives monthly from this contract, but Fink is
informed that Machock knows this information.
Harmer has also represented that he presently has$ 10,000 that he is willing to pay to
Machock.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4
Interrogatory
Please state all the facts that support the contention as set forth in your Third Defense to
the Complaint that the relief claimed by Machock in his Complaint "is barred because of
Machock's fraud."
Response
Fink, Machock, and Harmer have been acquaintances and friends since approximately
1997. From that time until at least May, 1998, Fink, Machock, and Harmer lived within close
proximity to one another in Bountiful, Utah. During this time, Machock and Fink joined the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and began attending the same ward as Harmer and
David Detton. In this regard, Harmer taught a Sunday school class for new church members that
was regularly attended by Machock and Fink.
In or about April 1998, Harmer desperately needed $125,000 to pay off a judgment that
had been entered against him in the Fourth District Court for Utah County, State of Utah.
Harmer was required to pay off this judgment on or before June 1, 1998.
In early May 1998, Harmer sought to borrow $125,000 from Machock.
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Machock had loaned money to Harmer on at least one prior occasion.
Machock responded to Harmer's request to borrow money by telling Harmer that he
could lend him the necessary $125,000, that he had a source of funding for a $125,000 loan but
that the majority of the loan would not come from Machock's personal funds, and that Harmer
would have to pledge some kind of collateral before the loan could be made.
In connection with his request to borrow $125,000, Harmer told Machock that several
years prior he had been declared bankrupt and, in part because of this bankruptcy, was not
considered a good credit risk for such a loan. In making this disclosure to Machock, Harmer
gave Machock his social security number so that Machock could run a credit check for himself.
Machock communicated Harmer" s social security number and the fact of Harmer's
bankruptcy to Dr. Edward Grootendorst ("Grootendorst"). Grootendorst was the intended source
of $75,000 of the $125,000 that Harmer needed to borrow. Machock and Harmer knew that
Grootendorst would be the source of $75,000 of the anticipated loan, but this was not disclosed
to Fink.
Grootendorst ran a credit check on Harmer. Grootendorst also interviewed Harmer about
the proposed loan. Based on this, Grootendorst told Machock that he did not think Harmer was a
good candidate to borrow $125,000. Grootendorst said that he did not want to participate in the
loan. Neither Machock nor Grootendorst told Fink that Grootendorst did not think Harmer was a
good candidate to borrow money.
Machock continued to tell Harmer that he could make $125,000 available for a loan so
long as Harmer would pledge some kind of collateral to secure the loan.
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Harmer proposed to pledge the house that he lived in, located at 1963 East Ridgehill
Drive, Bountiful (the "Harmer residence"), as collateral for the loan. However, Harmer did not
own any interest in this home. Greg Stuart ("Stuart") owned the Harmer residence, and Stuart's
interest was subject to various encumbrances. Harmer gave Machock a title report showing that
the property was owned by Stuart and that it was subject to various encumbrances.
In or about late May 1998, Machock and Harmer approached Fink, telling Fink that
Machock was going to loan $125,000 to Harmer to be secured by a pledge of the Harmer
residence, and they solicited Fink to participate in the loan by executing a "guarantee." No one
ever gave Fink a copy of the title report that had been given to Machock, but Machock and
Harmer did state that there were encumbrances on the property but that these encumbrances
would be subordinated to Machock's trust deed.
Specifically, on May 28,1998, at a face-to-face meeting at Fink's home, Machock and/or
Harmer represented the following to Fink:
a.

Machock and Harmer represented to Fink that Machock would loan
$125,000 to Harmer and that Harmer would execute a promissory note
requiring him to repay Machock $150,000;

b.

Machock and Harmer represented to Fink that the loan would be secured
by a first-priority trust deed on the Harmer residence, and that the
Machock trust deed would take its first-priority position because the
encumbrances that were already on the property would be subordinated to
Machock's trust deed;
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Machock and Harmer represented to Fink that Harmer would use a portion
of the loan proceeds to pay off an indebtedness Harmer owed (but no one
explained that this indebtedness resulted from a judgment or the amount of
this indebtedness), and that Harmer would use the remainder of the
proceeds to perform physical improvements to the Harmer residence so
that it could be immediately put up for sale;
Machock represented to Fink that he intended to obtain repayment of the
loan from proceeds of the sale of the Harmer residence;
Machock represented to Fink that he desired to fund the loan from money
that was available to him through a trust fund, but that in order for him to
do so the trust fund required him to obtain a "guarantee";
Machock and Harmer asked Fink if he would sign a "guarantee" so that
Machock could access the money in the trust fund and use it to fund the
loan to Harmer;
Machock represented to Fink that this "guarantee" was a mere formality
necessary in order for him to access the money in the trust fund and that he
would not seek to enforce the "guarantee" if Harmer failed to repay the
loan;
Machock represented to Fink that, in the event Harmer failed to repay the
loan, Machock would only seek recourse of foreclosure against the Harmer
residence to recover the money lent to Harmer;
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Machock represented to Fink that the Harmer residence was more than
sufficient collateral for the loan and, because of this, Machock would not
seek any recourse against Fink under the proposed "guarantee",

j

Machock and Harmer represented to Fink that what they were asking of
Fink was a "no risk proposition" because under no circumstances would
Machock seek to enforce the "guarantee" and under no circumstances
would Machock attempt to collect repayment of the loan proceeds from
Fink;

k.

Machock represented to Fink that the proposed "guarantee" would not
subject Fink to any liability whatsoever for repayment of the money that
Machock would lend to Harmer, and

1.

Machock represented to Fink that by signing the proposed "guarantee"
Fink would in no way be bound to repay any of the money that Machock
intended to loan to Harmer.

Despite the fact that Fink received nothing from either Harmer or Machock for his part in
the proposed transaction, and no consideration whatsoever for his execution of the "guarantee,"
m reliance on these representations, Fink agreed to provide Harmer and Machock the assistance
they requested with respect to the loan by executing the "guarantee" proposed by Machock.
On May 29, 1998, (1) Harmer executed a promissory note payable to Machock in the
amount of $150,000 and (n) Stuart executed a Trust Deed pledging the Harmer residence as
collateral to secure the loan Unknown to Fink at the time, this trust deed was not a first-priority
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encumbrance on the Harmer residence. Instead, the Harmer residence was already subject to
encumbrances that potentially left insufficient equity to satisfy payment of the Note.
That same day, Detton drafted the Guarantee. This Guarantee did not reflect any of the
representations and promises that were made to Fink the day before. Machock was out of the
country when Detton drafted the Guarantee, and did not review what his attorney had drafted.
That same day, before Fink had executed the Guarantee, Machock gave Harmer access to
a portion of the loan proceeds.
Later that same day, at approximately 4:30 p.m., acting on Machock's instruction,
Harmer retrieved the Guarantee from Detton and took it to Fink at Fink's office to have him
execute it. At this meeting Harmer was very emotional, and on the verge of crying, when he
explained to Fink that he was in dire need of the $125,000 loan from Machock and that Machock
was waiting for Fink to execute the "guarantee" that they had discussed before Machock would
disburse the loan proceeds to Harmer.
Harmer gave Fink the Guarantee, explained to Fink that the Guarantee had been prepared
by Machock's attorney, and implored Fink to execute the Guarantee without delay so that he
could quickly return it to Machock and thereby obtain the loan proceeds before the close of
business that day.
Fink was never given an opportunity to review the Note.
Under these circumstances, and in reliance on Machock's representations, Fink executed
the Guarantee without having his attorney review it.
Neither Machock nor Harmer ever told Fink about Harmer's bankruptcy or the fact that
Harmer was not creditworthy for this loan. Nor did Machock or Harmer tell Fink that Harmer
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did not own any interest in the Harmer residence, that the Trust Deed would not be a first priority
encumbrance on the Harmer residence, or that the majority of the funds for the loan would not be
provided by Machock.
Following his execution of the Guarantee, the $125,000 was loaned to Harmer. Only
$20,000 of this $125,000 was provided by Machock, the balance came from money that
Machock held in trust, from Machock's nephew, and from Dr. Grootendorst.
Harmer did not use any of the loan proceeds to perform improvements on the Harmer
residence.
Harmer never contracted with a real estate professional to sell the Harmer residence.
While Harmer did place a "for sale by owner" sign on the property on several occasions, Fink is
informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Harmer did not take reasonable steps to sell
the house.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5
Interrogatory
Please state all facts that support the contention as set forth in your Sixth Defense to the
Complaint that Machock's claim is barred by the doctrine of mistake.
Response
The facts that support this allegation are stated in Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4,
above. See Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6
Interrogatory
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Please state all facts that support the contention as set forth in your Eighth Defense to the
Complaint that Machock's claim is barred by "Machock's own breaches of Contract."
Response
The facts that support this allegation are stated in Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4,
above. See Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4.
In particular, a contract was formed when Machock promised Fink that he would not seek
to enforce the Guarantee in exchange for Fink executing the Guarantee so that Machock could
access the funds that he held in trust. Machock has breached this promise when he made demand
on Fink under the Guarantee and when he brought this lawsuit.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7
Interrogatory
Please state all facts that support the contention as set forth in your Ninth Defense to the
Complaint that Machock's claim is barred by "Machock's breaches of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair deal [sic]/'
Response
The facts that support this allegation are stated in Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4,
above. See Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4.
In particular, a contract was formed when Machock promised Fink that he would not seek
to enforce the Guarantee in exchange for Fink executing the Guarantee so that Machock could
access the funds that he held in trust. Machock breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing that is inherent in this contract promise when he made demand on Fink under the
Guarantee and when he brought this lawsuit.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8
Interrogatory
To the extent you contend as set forth in the Eleventh Defense to the Complaint, that
Machock "has failed to take all reasonable, necessary, and appropriate action to mitigate" the
damages complained of in the Complaint, please state all facts that support such contention.
Response
The facts that support this allegation are stated in Fink's response to interrogatories no. 2
and no. 3, above. See Fink's response to interrogatories no. 2 and 3.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:
Interrogatory
Please state all facts that support the contention that Fink's obligation under the
Guarantee was released, as set forth in your Thirteenth Defense to the Complaint.
Response
On July 31, 2000, Machock and Harmer entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual
Release. By this Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, Harmer stipulated to the entry of
judgment against him in the amount of $152,567.00 and Machock expressly released Harmer
from his obligations under the Note. The Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release provides:
For and in consideration of Harmer's execution of this
Stipulation for Confession of Judgement, Machock, his
heirs and assigns, release and forever discharge Harmer, his
heirs and assigns, from any and all past, present or future
claims, causes of action, attorney's fees, expenses and
compensation of any nature whatsoever, and whether for
actual, compensatory or punitive damages, which Machock
knows abut at this time, or should have known about, and
which now exists or may hereinafter accrue, on account of,
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on in any way arising out of, the underlying loan
transaction between Harmer and Machock. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to affect Machock's ability to
file the Stipulation for Confession of Judgment, obtain a
final judgment against Harmer for the amount due on the
promissory note, and seek satisfaction of that judgment
through judicial liens on any assets or property acquired by
Harmer in the future. (Settlement Agreement and Mutual
Release, \ 2.a.)
Nowhere does the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release reserve Machock's right to
pursue Fink to repay Harmer's obligation as expressed in the Note. Fink has not consented to
any liability to Machock under the terms of the Guarantee, and he has not consented to remain
liable notwithstanding Machock's release.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:
Interrogatory
Please state all material misrepresentations that you allege in the Sixteenth Defense to the
Complaint were made by Machock, the location that each alleged misrepresentation was made,
all individuals present at the time each alleged misrepresentation was made, and the
circumstances surrounding each such alleged misrepresentation.
Response
The material misrepresentations, and omissions of material facts, are recited in Fink's
response to interrogatory no. 4, above. See Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:
Interrogatory
Please state all facts that support the contention that [sic] as alleged in your Nineteenth
Defense to the Complaint that Machock failed to take advantage of a bona fide offer from a third
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party to purchase the collateral, including the identity of any alleged third party, the date such a
bona fide offer was made, the terms of such offer(s), any evidence of the alleged third party's
ability to perform such offer and when such offer(s) expired.
Response
On November 29, 1999, Keith Cook offered to pay $390,000 to purchase the house. The
terms of this offer are as stated in the Real Estate Purchase Contract that is attached to the
transcript of the Harmer Deposition taken on July 11, 2000.
On approximately January 28, 2000, an unidentified "prospective buyer" offered to pay
$350,000 to purchase the house. The terms of this offer are as stated in the memorandum from
John Harmer to John Baird and David Detton of January 28, 2000. During his deposition on July
11,2000, Harmer testified that this offer was made by one of his children, and her spouse, Mr.
and Mrs. Dionne, and that it was a good faith offer. The terms of the offer are also memorialized
in the memorandum from John Harmer to David Detton of February 15, 2000.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12:
Interrogatory
Please state all the reasons you executed the Guarantee attached as Exhibit B to the
Complaint.
Response
Fink executed the Guarantee because he was requested to do so by Harmer and Machock,
because he Machock told him that the Guarantee was necessary in order to allow Machock to
access trust money but that Machock would not take any action to enforce the Guarantee,
because Machock promised that Fink would have no obligation under the Guarantee, and
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because Machock and Harmer represented to Fink that Harmer's residence would be the sole
source of security for the loan.
Fink's reasons for executing the Guarantee are more particularly described in his
response to interrogatory no. 4. See Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13:
Interrogatory
Please describe all investigation you undertook in relation to the loan to Mr. Harmer
and/or the Guarantee prior to executing the Guarantee attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint.
Response
Fink objects to this interrogatory on the basis that it is vague and unintelligible in its use
of the undefined term "investigation." It is not understood what is intended by the use of the
term "investigation." Without waiving his objection Fink responds to the best he understands
this interrogatory, as follows:
Fink relied on the representations of Machock and Harmer, as more fully described in
Fink's response to interrogatory no. 4. In reliance on these representations, Fink did not
undertake an examination of the title of the Harmer residence and he did not perform a credit
check of Harmer.
INTERROGATORY NO, 14:
Interrogatory
Please identify all other guarantees that you have executed, including the identity of the
party's whose obligation was being guaranteed, the amount of the guarantee, and the date that the
guarantee was executed.
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Response
None.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15:
Interrogatory
Please identify any expert retained in this matter, the subject of any such expert's opinion,
and the basis for that opinion.
Response
Fink has retained Marty Bodell to give an opinion as to the fair market value of the
Harmer residence as of February 2000. Fink will produce a copy of Mr. BodelFs written
appraisal which states the substance of Mr. BodelFs opinion and the basis for that opinion.
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
Preliminary Statement
Fink's responses to these requests for production and the production of documents in
response thereto are neither admissions nor acknowledgments that the documents or the
information revealed therein is relevant to the subject matter of this action. All such documents
or information is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and
admissibility, and any and all other objections and grounds which would require the exclusion
thereof if the document, or any statement contained therein, were produced by a witness present
and testifying in court, all of which objections and grounds are reserved and may be interposed at
the time of trial.
Fink's investigation and discovery with regard to this litigation are not yet completed and
are continuing. The following responses are given without prejudice to Fink's right to
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supplement these responses, produce evidence of any subsequently discovered facts, or to make
appropriate changes in such responses if it should appear at any time that omissions or errors
have been made.
General Objections
Fink makes the following general objections to these requests for production. Every
general objection applies to each and every request for production and is incorporated into each
response herein. The assertion of the same, similar or additional objections in the individual
responses to these requests for production does not waive any of Fink's general objections or
limit the applicability or effect of these general objections to that particular request or any other
request.
A-

Fink objects to these requests for production to the extent they impose

requirements different or greater than those set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B.

Fink objects to each request for production to the extent that it seeks confidential,

non-public, proprietary, and/or commercially sensitive information.
C.

Fink objects to each request for production to the extent that it calls for

information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work
product doctrine.
D.

Fink objects to each request for production to the extent that it seeks information

more readily or equally available to the plaintiffs.
These objections are incorporated into each of the following responses.
REQUEST NO. 1:
Request
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Please produce all documents that support your denial of the statement set forth in
Paragraph 8 of your Answer that "the Guarantee is a guarantee of payment and performance and
not of collection, and is primary, not secondary in nature."
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 2:
Request
Please produce all documents that support your contention as set forth in your Third
Defense to the Complaint that Machock's claims are barred "because of Machock's fraud."
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
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Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 3:
Request
Please produce all documents that support the contention set forth in your Eighth Defense
to the Complaint that Machock's claims are barred by "Machock's own breaches of contract."
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 4:
Request
Please produce all documents that support the contention set forth in your Ninth Defense
to the Complaint that Machock's claims are barred by "Machock's breaches of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair deal [sic]."
Response
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Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 5:
Request
Please produce any documents furnished to or relied upon by any expert retained by you
concerning the fair market value of the former Harmer residence.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 6:
Request
Please produce any report prepared by any expert retained by you in this matter.
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Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 7:
Request
Please produce all documents that support your contention that Fink has been released
from his obligation set forth in the Guarantee.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 8:
Request
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Please produce all documents related to any offer to purchase the former Harmer
residence.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 9:
Request
Please produce all documents that support the contention as alleged in Paragraph 12 of
the Counterclaim that the loan would be secured by a first-priority deed of trust on the Harmer
residence.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
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Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 10:
Request
Please produce all documents that Machock ever provided to Fink in connection with or
concerning the Harmer loan or the Guarantee.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUESTNO.il:
Request
Please produce all documents that support the contention set forth in Paragraph 12 of the
Counterclaim that Machock represented that "Machock would not seek any recourse against Fink
under the proposed 'guarantee.'"
Response
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Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO. 12:
Request
Please produce all documents that support the contention set forth in Paragraph 12 of the
Counterclaim that Machock represented that "Fink would in no way be bound to repay any of the
money that Machock intended to loan to Harmer."
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO-13:
Request
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Please produce all documents related to any investigation that Fink conducted with
respect to the loan to Harmer or the Guarantee.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Fink further objects to this request on the basis that
it is vague and unintelligible in its use of the undefined term "investigation." It is not understood
what is intended by the use of the term "investigation." Without waiving his objections, Fink
responds to the best he understands this request, as follows:
Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
REQUEST NO-14:
Request
Please produce all documents identified in your response to or relied upon to respond to
Plaintiffs Interrogatories.
Response
Fink objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks the production of documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine, and documents that are
not in Fink's possession, custody or control. Without waiving his objections, Fink responds as
follows:
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Relevant, non-privileged documents that are in Fink's possession, custody or control will
be made available for inspection and copying at the offices of Durham Jones & Pinegar at a
mutually convenient time to be agreed upon by the parties.
DATED this Tyi 3ay of January, 2001.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

R. Stephen Mar§
David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Bill Fink
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Bill Fink, having been first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states: that he reviewed the
foregoing interrogatory answers; and that the same are true to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief.
DATED this ^ ' ° day of January, 2001.

Bill Fink
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _ ^ _ day of January, 2001.

1
Notary Public

v,

NOTARY PUBLIC

KAREN ACKLEY
111 East Broadway, #900
8«KUiwCtty,UT 64111
My Commission Expires
September 14,2001
STATE OF UTAH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS to be
mailed, postage prepaid by United States mails, this _/7_'day of January, 2001, to the following:
David K. Detton
Dorsey & Whitney LLP
170 South Main St., Suite 925
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gregory S. Tamkin
Dorsey & Whitney LLP
Republic Plaza Building, Suite 4400
370 Seventeenth Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
Facsimile (303) 629-3450
W. Kevin Jackson
Jensen, Duffin, Carman, Dibb & Jackson
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2379

S \DWT\Fink, WilliamMachock, Joseph\pleadings\Disc Resp, 2nd Req Prod wpd
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TabB

PAUL D. VEASY (3964)
ANGLE NELSON (8143)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
201 South Mam Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone- (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801)536-6111

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

vs.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

CARL WILLIAM ("BILL") FINK,
Defendant.

Case No. 990700380

JOSEPH MACHOCK,
Plaintiff,

Judge Darwin C. Hansen
AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS AND
CROSS-COMPLAINTS

Plaintiff Joseph Machock ("Machock") answers under oath the following interrogatories
and provides responses to the requests for production of documents submitted by defendant Carl
William Fink ("Fink").
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Machock objects to Fink's interrogatories and requests for production of

documents to the extent it calls for answers which are pnvileged, including, but not limited to,
documents and other items of information prepared in anticipation of litigation or for tnal or

requests for information or documents which fall within the attorney-client privilege and/or
work-product doctrine
2.

Machock objects to Fink's interrogatories and requests for production of

documents to the extent they are vague, overbroad, oppressive and unduly burdensome.
3.

Each of the general objections set forth herein shall be deemed to have been made

with respect to each specific interrogatory and request for production of documents unless
otherwise indicated.
Subject to the foregoing objections and reservations, which are incorporated into each
and every answer and response by Machock to Fink's interrogatories and requests for production
of documents, the answers and responses are given based upon a review of matters to date.
Machock reserves the right to supplement his answers if and when additional information is
obtained.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the full amount that you will seek to recover from
Fink at trial based on the Note and guarantee.
ANSWER: Machock will seek to recover the entire amount of principal and interest due
and owing under the Guarantee, in addition to all costs and attorneys' fees incurred to date,
which include Machock's Opposition to Fink's Motion for Summary Judgment and Machock's
Answer to Fink's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. As of May 15, 2003, the outstanding debt
owed by Fink, exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs, totals $157,033.42, which includes interest
at the rate of 10% per annum from September 22, 2001 to date. As interest is accruing on this

unpaid balance and attorneys' fees and costs continue to be incurred, which are excluded from
the above balance, the amount that Machock will seek to recover at trial will continue to
increase.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

State in detailed [sic] how you calculate the amount

identified in response to interrogatory no. 1, and identify all documents that pertain to this
calculation.
ANSWER: The amount identified in interrogatory no. 1 was calculated by determining
the unpaid principal and interest owed to date pursuant to Fink's Guarantee. Interest on this
amount was determined pursuant to section 15-1-1(2) of the Utah Code. All costs and attorneys*
fees will be based on an Affidavit of Fees and Costs from counsel to be filed at trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State what you will claim at trial as the fair market value
for the property at 1963 E. Ridgehill Drive, Bountiful, Utah, as of February 29, 2000 (the date of
the trustee's sale based on the deed of trust given in favor of Joseph Machock).
ANSWER: As of February 20, 2000, Machock believes the fair market value of the
property at 1963 E. Ridgehill Drive to be $308,613.38.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: State in detailed [sic] how you calculate the fair market
value identified in response to interrogatory no. 3, and identify all documents that pertain to this
calculation.
ANSWER: As of February 29, 2000, Machock had received notice of Brighton's Bank
Notice of Default and Election to Sell, dated February 2, 2000. Upon receiving this notice,
Machock informed Fink that he did not have the ability to pay the amount due and owing under
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Brighton Bank's trust deed and that Fink should therefore protect his interests as Machock
intended to pursue Fink's liability pursuant to his guarantee of payment. Accordingly, the fair
market value of the property at 1963 E. Ridgehill Drive was determined by calculating the
amount Machock bid at the June 29, 2000 foreclosure sale to obtain title to the property. See
also Response to Interrogatory No. 5, below.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify the amount you paid to acquire title to the property
at 1963 E. Ridgehill Drive via the trustee's sale on February 29, 2000.
ANSWER: Machock submitted a credit bid of $1,000 over the amount due and owing
pursuant to the first priority deed of trust held by Brighton Bank. At this time, upon information
and belief, Machock believes the amount due and owing pursuant to the Brighton Bank deed of
trust to be approximately $307,613.38, which represents the principal and interest due under the
deed of trust, together with costs of foreclosure and attorneys' fees. Machock reserves the right
to supplement this answer if additional information regarding this amount is obtained.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify the amount of each and every payment you have
received from John Harmer or from someone on Harmer's behalf.
ANSWER: To date, the following payments have been received from John Harmer or
from someone on Harmer's behalf:
1. Payment of $16,000 on February 15, 2000;
2. Payment of $3,000 in check from Kevin Jackson dated March 29, 2001;
3. Payment of $3,000 via check from Kevin Jackson dated April 28, 2001;
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4. Payment of $3,000 via check dated June 13, 2001 from Dorsey & Whitney,
LLP, as Trustee for Machock;
5. Payment of $3,000 via check dated July 6, 2001 from Dorsey & Whitney,
LLP, as Trustee for Machock;
6. Payment of $3,000, via check dated August 6, 2002 from Dorsey & Whitney,
LLP, as Trustee for Machock;
1. Payment of $3,000, via check dated September 14, 2001 from Dorsey &
Whitney, LLP as Trustee for Machock;
8. Payment of $3,000, via check from Kevin Jackson, dated September 25, 2001.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents identified in response to the preceding interrogatories.
RESPONSE: Machock will provide responsive, non-privileged documents not already in
the possession of Fink at a time to be arranged with Fink's counsel.
REQUEST NO. 2: Copies of any checks, drafts or other instruments that reflect a
payment made by or on behalf of John Harmer to you.
RESPONSE: Machock will provide responsive, non-privileged documents at a time to
be arranged with Fink's counsel.
DATED this J 3

day of May, 2003.

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

_ A ^ Sri?—PAUI(R VEASY
ANGEE NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF

COUNTY OF

Hooteur

Joseph Machock, being first duly sworn, says that he is the plaintiff and counterclaim
defendant in the foregoing action; that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof;
and that the same is true to his knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated on
information and belief, and as 10 those matters, he believes the same to be true and correct.
f\

SUBSCRIBED A N D SWORN to before me this

VERONICA M.AVHA
Commission # 1404937
H*o*Mte-Cd*m*a
f
Monfewy County
MyCfcmm&cpimMar 11< 20071
^ F P ^ W P ^ P mm
*******

i

5255802

5

day of M a y , 2 0 0 3 .

^T^ ^ r
m^
N O T A R Y PUBLIC

